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Abstract
It has been recognised for some time that there are close links between the various logics developed
for the analysis of multi-agent systems and the many game-theoretic models developed for the
same purpose. In this paper, we contribute to this burgeoning body of work by showing how a
probabilistic model checking tool can be used for the automated analysis of game-like multi-agent
systems in which both agents and environments can act with uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, we show how
a variation of the well-known alternating oﬀers negotiation protocol of Rubinstein can be encoded
as a model for the PRISM model checker and its behaviour analysed through automatic veriﬁcation
of probabilistic CTL’s properties.
Keywords: agents, uncertainty, probabilistic model-checking.
1 Introduction
In game theory, negotiation is thought of as a game where two players bargain
over one or several items. The players’ roles are distinct: the seller is willing
to get a proﬁt by selling the bargained items whereas the buyer is keen on
spending his/her resources (money) to buy them. The utility of each player
essentially depends on the game outcome (i.e. the value at which an agree-
ment is reached). A play of such a game (i.e. extensive game) is expressed
in term of an history which describes players’ subsequent moves throughout
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negotiation. The possible actions for a bargainer are either accepting the
most recent oﬀer or throwing a counter-oﬀer. A player’s strategy determines
his/her next move given a speciﬁc history (i.e. in a monetary negotiation a
strategy determine also the value of subsequent oﬀers in case of rejection of
the most recent oﬀer). The possible strategies for a player are also called pure
strategies. If uncertainty is accounted for, then probability distributions are
given to pure strategies and we talk about mixed strategies, hence expected
utilities. Game-theory aims to study properties of the players’ strategies. A
strategy which maximises a player’s utility (independently of the opponent’s
one) is said to be a dominant one, whereas a combination of strategies (for the
two players) forms a Nash equilibrium if no player will get a higher utility by
adopting another strategy given that the opponent will stick to the considered
one. Given a game G, questions like, “is there any dominant strategy?”, or,
“is there any Nash-equilibrium strategy combination?”, need to be addressed
by researchers. In this paper we focus on a variation of the well known Rubin-
stein’s alternating oﬀers’ negotiation framework. In particular we will consider
players adopting mixed strategies, rather than pure ones, and we show how, in
such a case, a probabilistic model-checker can be used as an alternative means
for the framework analysis. We consider a limited number of strategy proﬁles
and provide a comparative analysis in terms of the corresponding probability
distribution over the set of agreements (hence the expected utility). This ap-
proach diﬀers from both the simulation and mathematical analysis techniques
usually employed for game analysis. In particular, our approach is automatic,
as are simulation techniques, yet covers all possible behaviours of the sys-
tem, as do mathematical analysis techniques. Thus, our approach provides
an automatic way to analyse an exact computed expectation concerning the
possible system behaviours.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the
problem of negotiation, in particular the “alternating oﬀers” protocol, and
in Section 3 we outline the model checking approach, speciﬁcally probabilistic
model checking. We bring these two aspects together in Sections 4 and 5,
describing the probabilistic model of the bargaining protocol in Section 4 and
carrying out a range of veriﬁcation experiments on this scenario in Section 5.
Finally, in Section 6, we provide brief concluding remarks.
2 The alternating-oﬀers negotiation framework
A number of protocols and associated strategies for automatic negotiation in
multi-agent systems have been developed over the past two decades. One
of the earliest, and most inﬂuential, was the monotonic concession protocol
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and Zeuthen strategy adapted by Rosenschein and Zlotkin [10] from previous
work by Harsanyi and Zeuthen. In that work the authors gave the ﬁrst real
evaluation of such negotiation approaches in automated negotiation settings.
Most recent work in automated negotiation has focussed on an alternative
model of negotiation: the alternating oﬀers model proposed by Rubinstein [8].
Here we brieﬂy describe it referring the interested reader to the literature for
more details. In Rubinstein’s oﬀers model, agents take it in turns to make
an action. The action can be either (i) put forward a proposal (oﬀer), or (ii)
accept the most recent proposal. We assume just two agents, a and aˆ, and
negotiation takes place in a sequence of rounds, which we will assume are
indexed by the natural numbers. Agent a begins, at round 0, by making a
proposal x0, which agent aˆ can either accept (A) or reject (R). If the proposal
is accepted, then the deal x0 is implemented. Otherwise, negotiation moves
to another round, where agent aˆ makes a proposal (counter-oﬀer) and agent a
chooses to either accept or reject it. An history of such a game is a (possibly
inﬁnite) sequence (x0, R, x1, R, . . . , xn, . . .) and a terminal history is a ﬁnite
one terminated by A, (x0, R, x1, R, . . . , xn, A), with xn being the bargaining
outcome. A player’s utility describes the preference of a player over histories
(i.e. over negotiation outcomes) and players aim to maximise their utilities.
In Rubinstein’s framework time deadlines are considered for both players (T a
and T aˆ) hence inﬁnite histories are ruled out. Furthermore disagreement is
assumed to be the worst possible outcome hence the ﬁrst player meeting his
deadline will accept the most recent oﬀer (i.e. histories are all terminal).
Furthermore, in Rubinstein’s alternating oﬀers framework, the tactic for
generating players’ proposals is a function of time (1). The oﬀer made by agent
a to agent aˆ (either the buyer, b or the seller, s) at time time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T a) falls
between its Initial-Price (IP a) and its Reserved-Price (RP a) and is deﬁned as
follows:
pta→aˆ =
{
IP a+φa(t)(RP a−IP a) for a=b,
RP a+(1−φa(t))(IP a−RP a) for a=s,
(1)
Several time-dependent functions can be characterised by means of the Nego-
tiation Decision Function (NDF) φa(t), which is as follows:
φa(t) = ka + (1− ka)( t
T a
)
1
ψ (2)
where ka determines the price to be oﬀered by agent a in its ﬁrst proposal.
By varying the value of ψ in (2), diﬀerent types of tactic can be obtained
(see Figure 1 for φb(t)): with ψ < 1 we talk about boulware tactics (oﬀer in-
creases/decreases very slowly for most of the time and reaches the RP rapidly
as the time deadline approaches), with ψ = 1, we have linear tactics whereas
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with ψ > 1 we talk about conceder strategies. In the probabilistic variant
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Fig. 1. Types of φb(t)
of the Rubinstein’s framework we have realised the will of a player towards
accepting an oﬀer must be encoded, in terms of a probability function, as part
of a his strategy. We will deal with this aspect in Section 4.
3 Probabilistic Model Checking
Model Checking [4] is a well established methodology for testing a system’s
model against properties expressed in terms of some temporal logic formulae.
A model checker takes a model M and a formula φ as inputs and returns
either YES if φ is satisﬁed on all executions through M (i.e. M |= φ) or NO
if it is not (i.e. M |= φ), providing, in such a case, a counter-example of the
checked property.
Model-checking techniques may be classiﬁed with respect to the type of
model they refer to. In this sense we may distinguish between models which
allow to represent non-determinism without enclosing any “quantiﬁcation” of
the uncertainty (i.e. non-probabilistic system), as opposed to models which
incorporate information about the likelihood of possible future evolutions (i.e.
probabilistic systems). Non-probabilistic systems can be modelled in terms
of Labelled Transition Systems (LTS), essentially state-graphs whose nodes
are attached with propositions stating what is true in a state. Linear Time-
temporal Logic [9] and its branching-time extension, the Computational Tree
Logic [3], allow for the veriﬁcation of qualitative properties against a LTS
(e.g. properties such as “in any possible execution a safe-state is reached at
some point” or “no deadlock-state can be ever reached”). When indications
about the likelihood of the system behaviour can be devised, then a proba-
bilistic model may be built. Markov processes [5] are a subclass of stochastic
processes suitable for modelling systems such that the probability of possible
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future evolutions depends uniquely on the current state rather than on its past
history (i.e. the path which lead to it). A system’s timing is also taken care
of with Markov chains models leading to either Discrete time Markov chains
(DTMC), for which time is considered as discrete quantity, or Continuous
time Markov chains (CTMC), when time is thought as a continuous one. The
veriﬁcation of Markov chains via model checking has been widely developed
during last decades, resulting in the characterisation of speciﬁc temporal log-
ics and veriﬁcation algorithms: the Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic
(PCTL) [6] for veriﬁcation of DTMC and the Continuous Stochastic Logic
(CSL) [2], for CTMC veriﬁcation. In the following we brieﬂy introduce the
basic for PCTL model checking, which is the veriﬁcation technique we are
referring to in this work. For a detailed treatment the reader is referred to the
literature.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a set of atomic propositions AP , a labelled DTMC M
is a tuple (S,P, L) where S is a ﬁnite set of states, P : S×S → [0, 1] is
the transition probability matrix such that ∀s ∈ S, ∑s′∈S P(s, s′) = 1 and
L :S → 2AP is a labelling function.
A path in a given a DTMC M = (S,P, L) and its probability measure are
formally characterised in the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A path σ from state s0 is an inﬁnite sequence σ= s0→ s1→
. . .→sn→ . . . such that ∀i∈N, P(si, si+1)>0. Given σ, σ[k] denotes the k-th
element of σ.
The probability measure of a set of inﬁnite paths with common ﬁnite preﬁx
σ ↑ n = s0 → . . . → sn is deﬁned as the product of the probability of the
transitions in the preﬁx σ↑n.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let σ ↑ n = s0 → . . . → sn be a ﬁnite path of M. The
probability measure of the set of (inﬁnite) paths preﬁxed by σ↑n is
Prob(σ ↑ n) =
n−1∏
i=0
P(si, si+1)
if n > 0, whereas Prob(σ ↑ n)=1 if n=0.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (PCTL syntax) The syntax of PCTL state-formulae (φ)
and path-formulae (ϕ) is inductively deﬁned as follows with respect to the
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set of atomic propositions AP :
φ := a | tt | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Pp(ϕ)
ϕ := φ U≤t φ
where a∈AP , p∈ [0, 1], t∈N∗∪{∞} and ∈{≥, >,≤, <},
The PCTL semantics is as the CTL one except for probabilistic path-formulae.
The formula Pp(ϕ) is satisﬁed in a state s iﬀ the probability measure of
paths starting at s and satisfying ϕ, denoted Prob(s, ϕ), fulﬁls the bound
 p. Formally:
s |= Pp(φ′ U≤tφ′′) iﬀ Prob(s, (φ′ U≤tφ′′))  p
where the semantics of (φ′ U≤tφ′′) with respect to a path σ is deﬁned as:
σ |= φ′U≤tφ′′ iﬀ ∃i≤ t : σ[i] |=φ′′ ∧ ∀j<i, σ[j] |=φ′
Essentially PCTL extends CTL’s expressiveness in two ways: by allowing a
continuous path-quantiﬁcation (i.e. CTL existential and universal path quan-
tiﬁers are replaced by a single continuous quantiﬁer, namely Pp) 4 and by
introducing a discrete time-bounding for Until-formulae. For a complete treat-
ment of PCTL model checking we refer the reader to [6].
4 DTMC Model of Rubintein’s Protocol
In this section we describe how we have built the DTMC model for the negoti-
ation framework introduced in Section 2. The model has been implemented in
the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henziger [1], the input language
for the Probabilistic Model-Checker PRISM [7], and it consists of two mod-
ules, the Buyer and the Seller, that reproduce the players’ behaviour described
by the UML state-chart diagrams of Figure 2. In essence the buyer and the
seller alternatively throw a bid/counter bid then wait for the other player to
make a decision on their oﬀer. If the oﬀer is accepted (i.e. an agreement has
been reached) then the purchase takes place and the negotiation is success-
fully completed. State-diagrams in Figure 2 refer to a conﬁguration where
the Buyer starts the bidding process, hence the Seller is initially waiting to
receive the buyer’s ﬁrst oﬀer.
For a player the decision on the opponent’s oﬀer is a probabilistic one,
which depends on the oﬀered amount. For characterising such a probability
4 PCTL is a superset of CTL’s as: E(φUφ)≡P>0(φUφ) and A(φUφ) ≡ P≥1(φUφ)
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Fig. 2. Buyer and Seller state-charts
we have introduced the so called Acceptance Probability functions, S AP ()
and B AP () respectively, which return a probability value depending on the
oﬀer’s price (x) and time (t). In deﬁning such functions we have identiﬁed
three relevant aspects which must be accounted for. First, oﬀers ruled out
by a player’s reserved price must be given a null probability, given the time
deadline has not been reached. Secondly, since we are assuming disagreement
being the worst possible outcome, any price oﬀered at reaching of a player’s
time deadline will be certainly accepted. Finally, for the sake of symmetry,
players should be equally likely to accept oﬀers of “equally utility” (i.e. whose
distance from their respective RP is the same). With that points in mind we
have deﬁned S AP () and B AP () in the following manner:
S AP (x, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if (x≤S RP ) ∧ (t<T s)
1− S RPx if (x>S RP ) ∧ (t<T s)
1 if (t≥T s)
(3)
B AP (x, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if (x<=0) ∨ (t≥T b)
1+ S RPx−(B RP+S RP ) if (S RP <x<B RP ) ∧ (t<T b)
0 if (x>B RP ) ∧ (t<T b)
(4)
Figure 3 depicts the acceptance probability for both players for oﬀers re-
ceived within the time deadline (i.e. the curves in Figure 3 refer to the projec-
tions of function 3 and 4 over a generic time instant t, i.e. functions S AP (t)
and B AP (t) with t < T s and t < T b) 5. It should be noted that our deﬁni-
tion presumes the buyer is aware of the seller’s reserved price (see function 4).
Although unrealistic this choice does not aﬀect the aim of our work which is
to show that probabilistic model checking can be fruitfully used for the anal-
ysis of games. Alternative formulations of S AP () and B AP () which do not
require breaching players’ privacy are possible.
5 the depicted curves correspond to a setting such that the seller and buyer reserved price
are, respectively, S RP =1000 and S RP =10000.
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Piecewise approximation of NDFs. In our model the continuous NDFs
(φ(t)) belonging to the family deﬁned in equation 2 are approximated by
piecewise linear functions consisting of two pieces 6 (see Figure 4) 7. The oﬀer
function has three parameters: the slope of the ﬁrst piece, the slope of the sec-
ond piece and boundary (switch time) between the pieces. The desired setting
(boulware/conceder strategy) is chosen through model conﬁguration so that
diﬀerent strategy proﬁles (strategy combinations) are veriﬁed (i.e. probability
for each possible negotiation outcome are derived).
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6 A two piece line is a good approximation for extreme bargaining tactics (i.e. ψ ∼ 0 or
ψ>>1), which is the type of non-linear tactics we are interested to address in this work. Less
extreme strategies may be better approximated by multi-piece lines, which would require
minimal modiﬁcations to our model in order to be coped with.
7 the depicted curves correspond to speciﬁc settings for the pieces’ slopes and switch-time.
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5 Model’s veriﬁcation
The probabilistic behaviour (i.e. the Acceptance probability functions) en-
coded within the DTMC model of the alternating oﬀer framework, results
in a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes of the ne-
gotiation (i.e. the interval [S RP,B RP ]), hence over a strategy proﬁle’s
payoﬀ. For verifying our model we have considered only settings such that
S RP < B RP , in particular we referred most of our analysis to conﬁgurations
with S RP = 10000 and S RP = 11000
Once a strategy proﬁle (e.g. Boulware-Boulware or Conceder-Conceder,
etc.) has been chosen by conﬁguration, the corresponding probability distri-
bution is determined by verifying, with the PRISM tool, the following PCTL
formula against the framework model:
P =?(tt U(agreement)∧(purchase=PV AL)) (5)
The above property captures those evolutions for which an agreement over a
speciﬁc value (PV AL) is reached, at some point, during the bargaining process.
With the PRISM tool, the veriﬁcation of (5) for every possible agreement
value (PV AL∈ [S RP,B RP ]) provide us with the distribution of the probability
over the set of outcomes, hence the resulting expected utility can be straight-
forwardly derived (for the sake of brevity we do not report it in here).
Before starting the veriﬁcation phase the model needs to be conﬁgured. The
conﬁguration requires setting a number of parameters amongst which the
strategy combination which we want to study (i.e. the strategy’s slopes and
switch-time for both players’). The possible strategies are clearly inﬁnite,
however for our purpose we consider only a limited number of combinations
which we aim to compare through the results of model veriﬁcation. In order
to improve model’s eﬃciency, the accepting interval (i.e. [S RP,B RP ]) is actu-
ally set by means of two distinct parameters: the interval width and its oﬀset
from the origin. We observe that the numerical result of model veriﬁcation is
aﬀected by the chosen interval (as a result of functions (3) and (4) deﬁnition).
In the following we report some of the results we have obtained by veriﬁca-
tion of (5) for an accepting interval arbitrary set to [10000, 11000] (i.e. width:103,
oﬀset:104). We will compare the resulting probability distribution (cumula-
tive) for diﬀerent strategy proﬁles, pointing out which strategy is dominant
amongst the considered ones. The results we present are grouped according
to diﬀerent strategy types. We denote Lin(x)-Lin(y), non-linear strategy pro-
ﬁles such that x and y are the slopes of the ﬁrst segment for, respectively, the
buyer’s and the seller’s NDF and, furthermore, assuming the players’ NDFs
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intersect before the switch-time. On the other hand, for example, we use
Boul(x/x′)-Conc(y/y′) to denote a proﬁle such that players’ NDFs do not
intersect before the switch-time and the buyer is adopting a boulware tac-
tic with x and x′ being the slopes, respectively, before and after switching,
whereas the seller is using a conceder strategy with slopes y and y′.
Linear-Linear symmetrical: in this setting we consider Lin(x)-Lin(y) pro-
ﬁles of equal slope (i.e. x = y) . In Figure 5(a) the probability distribution for
the possible agreements is compared for diﬀerent slope’s value (i.e. Lin(10),
Lin(50) and Lin(100)). This graph essentially shows that larger slope’s values
result in a higher probability for equal values in the accepting interval. The
corresponding expectation values are roughly the same: Exp(Lin(10))∼498,
Exp(Lin(50)) ∼ 499 and Exp(Lin(100)) ∼ 500, showing a larger slope tend
to advantage the seller. This is also conﬁrmed by the graphs in Figure 5(b)
that represent the cumulative distribution functions for the three cases. The
curves in there show that larger strategy’s gradients are better from the seller
point of view as they cumulate most of the probability close to the supremum
of the accepting interval.
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Fig. 5. Lin(x)-Lin(y) symmetrical proﬁles
Linear-Linear asymmetrical: here we consider proﬁles of type Lin(x)-
Lin(y) but with diﬀerent slope’s value (i.e. x = y). For studying the in-
cidence of the strategy’s gradient on the probabilistic outcome of negotia-
tion we consider a ﬁxed value for the slope of one player while varying the
other’s. In Figure 6 the cumulative distributions for several asymmetrical
Lin(x)-Lin(y) proﬁles are depicted. We observe that by increasing the buyer’s
slope while the seller’s one is set, for example, to 10 (e.g. by comparing the
curves for proﬁles Lin(50)-Lin(10), and Lin(100)-Lin(10)) the probability
tend to cumulate closer to the supremum of the interval (which is good for
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the seller). Again this is conﬁrmed by looking at the expectation values,
which show the same tendency, with Exp(Lin(50)Lin(10)) ∼ 692, whereas
Exp(Lin(100)Lin(10))∼804.
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Non-linear asymmetrical: similar conclusions are valid also when we con-
sider non-linear proﬁles for which the NDFs intersect after switching and
slopes are diﬀerent (for both pieces). In Figure 7(a) the cumulative prob-
ability for asymmetrical Conceder combinations with diﬀerent gradients are
compared. There we can observe that proﬁles which switch to the low gra-
dient piece of the strategy earlier tend to cumulate the probability closer to
the higher utility half of the interval. This is evident, for example, if we
compare curves of equal gradients but diﬀerent swith time as in Conc(10/1)-
Conc(100/10)-T sw :4 and Conc(10/1)-Conc(100/10)-T sw :8 in Figure 7(a),
the former corresponding to an earlier switch time for the seller (equal to 4)
the latter to a delayed switch time (equal to 8).
Similarly, in Figure 7(b) the cumulative probability for Boul(1/100) -
Conc(100/1) proﬁles are compared with respect to to diﬀerent value of switch
time for the seller. The graphs in Figure 7(b) conﬁrm that for constant slope’s
values, a non-linear strategy with the earliest switch time is dominant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown a diﬀerent approach to the veriﬁcation of multi-
player games which can be used as an alternative to (or in conjunction with)
analytical methods and/or simulation. We have illustrated how the analysis
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Fig. 7. Outcome cumulative probability for non-linear strategy proﬁles
of speciﬁc negotiation (mixed) strategies can be performed by means of proba-
bilistic model checking. This is achieved by developing an ad hoc probabilistic
model which is then veriﬁed against probabilistic properties with the PRISM
model checker.
This analysis has helped in comparing the eﬀect that several strategic
variables has on the probabilistic outcome of negotiation. In particular we
have shown that, larger values of the oﬀers function’s slope result in larger
expected agreements as probability distribution for accepted oﬀers tends to
cumulate toward the supremum of the accepting interval. Furthermore with
respect to non-linear strategies of constant slopes, the earliest switch time
(to the low gradient piece of piecewise linear oﬀer function) is dominant with
respect to the others.
At the best of our knowledge, this work provides a novice contribution
for using a well established and eﬀective automated veriﬁcation technique as
model-checking for game analysis. While we have only presented a selection
of the results obtained and much work has still to be done we believe that this
approach has the potential for improvements in game analysis, in automated
analysis procedures, and in the development of sophisticated negotiation sce-
narios. Speciﬁcally our ﬁrst priority for future developments is to address the
issue of Nash equilibria analysis via model-checking.
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